奇爱博士

重提疯癫与文明
——评《奇爱博士》、《发条橙》和《飞越疯人院》

福柯自有《疯癫与文明》一书，而结合福柯异于常人的性取向来看，也许真的有很多不明就里的人会认为福柯自己本身就是一个疯子。可是，要知道《疯癫与文明》本质上是一部历史学著作，而福柯的哲学思考，或者说他人对福柯及其理论的哲学解释，都是基于历史而言的。然而要在中国的语境下去理解福柯所叙述的疯癫与文明的关系史，几乎很容易产生偏差，尤其是只有印刷文本的情况下。因为中国并没有疯人院，或者说精神病院的历史，要说有，那也是20世纪的精神病院，这与西方漫长的处理“疯人”的历史相比，是小巫见大巫。所以，当一位不研究西方的中国人提到“疯狂”这个词时，贬抑的含义是会首先进入他或她的脑海的。在中国考察“疯”一字，恐怕没有一段与之相关的历史。《集韵》称“疯”为头风病，即脑血栓之意。以“疯”指称“精神错乱”，怕是20世纪之后的含义，说不定也与东亚某国的语言有关。而到近些年，我们学着西方，把一些中性的含义也加入了“疯”一字，指做事的反常。这便慢慢接近西方语言了。另外，“癫”字更常见地是与“疯”同义，而自近代以来也逐渐包含了“不羁”的意思。福柯在他的疯癫历史书中，讲述了从文艺复兴时期开始的西方“文明社会”对“疯癫”以及“疯癫之人”的看法的流变，正如我刚才所说，这并未在“例外的例外”的中国土地上出现。

进入21世纪，影像文本开始广泛参与“文化研究”。所谓“文化研究”，想必反映了博学的大师们，对人文领域的一切现象进行考察的梦想。文化研究者的一个预设是，某一现象绝非单纯的哲学的、历史的、文学的或社会学的现象，它必定为各方面因素联动的结果，任意一方面因素的单独解释都是不完美的，都不能揭示这一现象的“真实”。因此，它们致力于让自己博学，于是影像文本便成为文化研究不可或缺的对象之一。在拙文中将要提及的三部影片，《奇爱博士》（1964年）、《发条橙》（1971年）和《飞越疯人院》（1975年），除了第一部，想必都是文化研究者不应遗漏的文本吧。笔者不愿意，也没有能力成为一位博学的文化研究者，只是希望在拙文中胡乱书写一些小感想，其抛砖引玉之功，便是想让文化大家们略略回头，你们是否在考察过去的现象时也不应忽视影像文本呢？

《飞越疯人院》的英文原名大意是“飞越杜鹃巢之人”，将“杜鹃巢”译为疯人院，是一个并不非常聪明的做法。尽管字典上很明白地写着，“杜鹃”在某些情况下就是指“缺乏理智、愚蠢、疯狂”，不过我想不是每位观众都会去翻字典的。和拙文主题联系最紧密的也就是此片，它直接地将故事设置在一家精神病院之中。很多时候我们还是会把取难而舍易，认为精神病院就是一个社会，或者说一个政府，病人就是社会中的被政府所管辖的个体。这样想没有问题，但是，影片所表现的精神病院的规则，并没有太多的夸张和虚饰——就应该如此（网上某篇影评认为此片表现了“资本主义社会精神病院的罪恶”）。我们不应在还未弄清楚精神病院和病人本身关系之前，就开始大谈政府和社会，政府和个人的问题，然后去联系捷克裔导演佛曼“布拉格之春”后的逃亡。

是精神病院认为病人是有精神问题的吗？理解影片之后，我们会得到否定的答案。首先，除了麦克墨菲，其他病人几乎都是自愿来到医院接受治疗的。其次，从某种意义上说，麦克墨菲也是自愿前来的（装病），他的个人特殊性在于他在来之前是一名罪犯，因此他终究无法“想走就走”。第三，医院无法确定麦克墨菲是患病的，所以他们才将他留下继续观察。这样，精神病院是影片中包括麦克墨菲的所有人的避难所，只是因为麦克墨菲本身有着强烈的个性，所以他尽管逃避了监狱中的繁重劳动，但并没有在医院中获得满足。麦克墨菲的个性和身份是为了情节发展而设定的，是一种偶然性的因素。要分析疯癫，我们的关注点就不应在麦克墨菲身上：他自始至终都没有认为自己发生了精神错乱。而那些像哈定、比利之类的人物，他们自己觉得自己不正常，这才是关键所在。

让我们暂停一下，跳到《发条橙》一片上。笔者认为此片最能揭示中心的一句台词，是在影片第二部分的结尾处。那里，主角亚历克斯接受了研究所的心理治疗，从而对暴力和性产生了极度的厌恶。尝到这项心理治疗计划的内政部长弗雷德里克认为，痊愈的人们将不再使他人受难，而是永远使自己受难——人人都将被拯救，人人都将是耶稣。可惜的是，当前只有亚历克斯一人得到了“拯救”，如果世界上只有他一位神灵，那么他的结果就是被恶魔所击垮。当然，影片最后让亚历克斯这位现代世界的耶稣如圣经故事所述一般复活了，那么，如同老年黑人所说的失却法律和秩序的肮脏的现代世界，就因耶稣的死而警醒了吗？影片的结束画面仍然是性爱，受人们所鼓励和支持的性爱。内政部长的得意的“消灭犯罪”的计划，在舞台上就差点为一名貌似反对党政治家的发言所完全驳倒。这名反对党说，亚历克斯现在已经没有任何选择了，尤其是没有道德上的选择，他无法选择去从善或者从恶。反讽的是，不论是内政部长还是亚历克斯自己，亚历克斯走出研究所的时候，都不断地暗示：从现在起，你自由了。显然，影片希望说明的是，当道德标准也成为政府的统一政策时，那人们就真正是被上了发条了。

回到疯人院。疯人院是政府或者社会，或者说“文明”所设立的，历史地看，疯人院中的疯人便是“不文明”的人。亚历克斯被强制送到监狱或者研究所去“文明化”，而哈定和比利则自愿地或半自愿地进入医院接受“文明化”。如果后者不进入医院，那么他们会被“文明”看作“不文明”的人，最终的结果也是强制性的。观众可能还记得这样一个场景。麦克墨菲问拉契德护士，他能不能不吃药，搞特殊。拉契德护士回答他说，他不自觉吃药，医院自然有办法强制他吃药。在《飞越疯人院》的整个剧情中，麦克墨菲始终在抵制医院的治疗，但他没有一次是能战胜医院的保安而按照其自由意志行动的。那么，“文明”所认为的疯癫与不疯癫之间的界线是什么呢？正如福柯所说，一切都是理性惹的祸。自文艺复兴时期到19世纪，疯人的悲惨史决不能怪罪于某一特定的社会或政府，而是应该让理性，还有秉持理性理想的人们进行深刻的反思。甚至可以这么说，没有理性，就没有疯癫的历史。

理性本身是无罪的，理性也不负有原罪。但在疯癫史上，为何理性如同鲁迅笔下的礼教一般吃人了呢？在《发条橙》和《飞越疯人院》两部影片中，我们都深深地为不理性的罪犯和病人们同情。我随机问过一些《飞越疯人院》的观众，问他们：拉契德护士是正面角色还是反面角色？回答都是反面角色。然而，理性没有错，同时理性也不能被迷信。犯罪难道不应该被打击吗？如果不是，那为什么几乎所有观众都会在《发条橙》中的暴力和强奸式或滥交式性爱镜头感到不适？影片的第三部分弥漫着深深的忧虑和思考，到底应该让“文明”去为人们选择理性，还是让人们在犯罪之前自觉地选择理性？这种自觉性是否可能？也许，自愿进入疯人院的那些病人在某种程度上已经是自觉的了，但是他们在进入医院之前已经对社会造成了某种危害和混乱，所以这里的自觉并不完全。印第安人最后成功逃出医院，奔向未知，我们仍然没有看到答案。

答案在《奇爱博士》之中吗？影片很短，一群“疯狂”的人们将人类文明导向毁灭。影片的反战主题十分明显，然而，核战争的爆发原因却是荒诞的。片中，美国总统可能认为除了他自己，所有人都已进入疯癫状态，殊不知，对苏联实施核打击的作战制度却是通过“民主”讨论后得出的，美国总统也参与了这些讨论。因此，民主也并不意味着根本的理性，否则，“理性”的美国总统也不至于很难挽回严重的后果。也许，里帕将军的过于敏感和性问题确实让他不会理性；也许，奇爱博士对世界末日和人类毁灭和地下生活的向往使他看起来是最不理性的一个人；可是，世界末日的到来却不仅仅来自于这两个人的冲动和科学技术，也不仅仅来自于美国人民的民主制度所造成的无可挽回的核攻击计划，而是还要加上会被自动触发的苏联人的“末日武器”。如果将世界浓缩为冷战时期的两个超级大国，那么人类的毁灭竟然是人类自己导致的，也就是说，自杀，这一永远被定义为疯狂的举动的动机，竟然是大多数人的不疯狂、大多数人的理性。

综合三部影片看，理性到了穷途末路的地步：理性首先无法为人类自觉地选择，而强制地灌输理性则是不理性的；另一方面，大多数人的理性甚至有可能导致世界末日，而非乌托邦。三部影片的拍摄年代距今已有三十年，今天的我们重提理性的话题，但有时间和精力去思考理性的人已经变少了。在这个连思想都是可以被消费的时代，人类能够从财富的汪洋之中探出头来，静心凝望头顶的星空并敬畏之吗？

(PUBLISHED IN THE NEW YORKER, BY ERIC SCHLOSSER, ON JANUARY 23, 2014)

This month marks the fiftieth anniversary of Stanley Kubrick’s black comedy about nuclear weapons, “Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.” Released on January 29, 1964, the film caused a good deal of controversy. Its plot suggested that a mentally deranged American general could order a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union, without consulting the President. One reviewer described the film as “dangerous … an evil thing about an evil thing.” Another compared it to Soviet propaganda. Although “Strangelove” was clearly a farce, with the comedian Peter Sellers playing three roles, it was criticized for being implausible. An expert at the Institute for Strategic Studies called the events in the film “impossible on a dozen counts.” A former Deputy Secretary of Defense dismissed the idea that someone could authorize the use of a nuclear weapon without the President’s approval: “Nothing, in fact, could be further from the truth.” (See a compendium of clips from the film.) When “Fail-Safe”—a Hollywood thriller with a similar plot, directed by Sidney Lumet—opened, later that year, it was criticized in much the same way. “The incidents in ‘Fail-Safe’ are deliberate lies!” General Curtis LeMay, the Air Force chief of staff, said. “Nothing like that could happen.” The first casualty of every war is the truth—and the Cold War was no exception to that dictum. Half a century after Kubrick’s mad general, Jack D. Ripper, launched a nuclear strike on the Soviets to defend the purity of “our precious bodily fluids” from Communist subversion, we now know that American officers did indeed have the ability to start a Third World War on their own. And despite the introduction of rigorous safeguards in the years since then, the risk of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear detonation hasn’t been completely eliminated.

The command and control of nuclear weapons has long been plagued by an “always/never” dilemma. The administrative and technological systems that are necessary to insure that nuclear weapons are always available for use in wartime may be quite different from those necessary to guarantee that such weapons can never be used, without proper authorization, in peacetime. During the nineteen-fifties and sixties, the “always” in American war planning was given far greater precedence than the “never.” Through two terms in office, beginning in 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower struggled with this dilemma. He wanted to retain Presidential control of nuclear weapons while defending America and its allies from attack. But, in a crisis, those two goals might prove contradictory, raising all sorts of difficult questions. What if Soviet bombers were en route to the United States but the President somehow couldn’t be reached? What if Soviet tanks were rolling into West Germany but a communications breakdown prevented NATO officers from contacting the White House? What if the President were killed during a surprise attack on Washington, D.C., along with the rest of the nation’s civilian leadership? Who would order a nuclear retaliation then?

With great reluctance, Eisenhower agreed to let American officers use their nuclear weapons, in an emergency, if there were no time or no means to contact the President. Air Force pilots were allowed to fire their nuclear anti-aircraft rockets to shoot down Soviet bombers heading toward the United States. And about half a dozen high-level American commanders were allowed to use far more powerful nuclear weapons, without contacting the White House first, when their forces were under attack and “the urgency of time and circumstances clearly does not permit a specific decision by the President, or other person empowered to act in his stead.” Eisenhower worried that providing that sort of authorization in advance could make it possible for someone to do “something foolish down the chain of command” and start an all-out nuclear war. But the alternative—allowing an attack on the United States to go unanswered or NATO forces to be overrun—seemed a lot worse. Aware that his decision might create public unease about who really controlled America’s nuclear arsenal, Eisenhower insisted that his delegation of Presidential authority be kept secret. At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he confessed to being “very fearful of having written papers on this matter.”

President John F. Kennedy was surprised to learn, just a few weeks after taking office, about this secret delegation of power. “A subordinate commander faced with a substantial military action,” Kennedy was told in a top-secret memo, “could start the thermonuclear holocaust on his own initiative if he could not reach you.” Kennedy and his national-security advisers were shocked not only by the wide latitude given to American officers but also by the loose custody of the roughly three thousand American nuclear weapons stored in Europe. Few of the weapons had locks on them. Anyone who got hold of them could detonate them. And there was little to prevent NATO officers from Turkey, Holland, Italy, Great Britain, and Germany from using them without the approval of the United States.

In December, 1960, fifteen members of Congress serving on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had toured NATO bases to investigate how American nuclear weapons were being deployed. They found that the weapons—some of them about a hundred times more powerful than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima—were routinely guarded, transported, and handled by foreign military personnel. American control of the weapons was practically nonexistent. Harold Agnew, a Los Alamos physicist who accompanied the group, was especially concerned to see German pilots sitting in German planes that were decorated with Iron Crosses—and carrying American atomic bombs. Agnew, in his own words, “nearly wet his pants” when he realized that a lone American sentry with a rifle was all that prevented someone from taking off in one of those planes and bombing the Soviet Union.

* * *
The Kennedy Administration soon decided to put locking devices inside NATO’s nuclear weapons. The coded electromechanical switches, known as “permissive action links” (PALs), would be placed on the arming lines. The weapons would be inoperable without the proper code—and that code would be shared with NATO allies only when the White House was prepared to fight the Soviets. The American military didn’t like the idea of these coded switches, fearing that mechanical devices installed to improve weapon safety would diminish weapon reliability. A top-secret State Department memo summarized the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1961: “all is well with the atomic stockpile program and there is no need for any changes.”

After a crash program to develop the new control technology, during the mid-nineteen-sixties, permissive action links were finally placed inside most of the nuclear weapons deployed by NATO forces. But Kennedy’s directive applied only to the NATO arsenal. For years, the Air Force and the Navy blocked attempts to add coded switches to the weapons solely in their custody. During a national emergency, they argued, the consequences of not receiving the proper code from the White House might be disastrous. And locked weapons might play into the hands of Communist saboteurs. “The very existence of the lock capability,” a top Air Force general claimed, “would create a fail-disable potential for knowledgeable agents to ‘dud’ the entire Minuteman [missile] force.” The Joint Chiefs thought that strict military discipline was the best safeguard against an unauthorized nuclear strike. A two-man rule was instituted to make it more difficult for someone to use a nuclear weapon without permission. And a new screening program, the Human Reliability Program, was created to stop people with emotional, psychological, and substance-abuse problems from gaining access to nuclear weapons.

Despite public assurances that everything was fully under control, in the winter of 1964, while “Dr. Strangelove” was playing in theatres and being condemned as Soviet propaganda, there was nothing to prevent an American bomber crew or missile launch crew from using their weapons against the Soviets. Kubrick had researched the subject for years, consulted experts, and worked closely with a former R.A.F. pilot, Peter George, on the screenplay of the film. George’s novel about the risk of accidental nuclear war, “Red Alert,” was the source for most of “Strangelove” ’s plot. Unbeknownst to both Kubrick and George, a top official at the Department of Defense had already sent a copy of “Red Alert” to every member of the Pentagon’s Scientific Advisory Committee for Ballistic Missiles. At the Pentagon, the book was taken seriously as a cautionary tale about what might go wrong. Even Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara privately worried that an accident, a mistake, or a rogue American officer could start a nuclear war.

Coded switches to prevent the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons were finally added to the control systems of American missiles and bombers in the early nineteen-seventies. The Air Force was not pleased, and considered the new security measures to be an insult, a lack of confidence in its personnel. Although the Air Force now denies this claim, according to more than one source I contacted, the code necessary to launch a missile was set to be the same at every Minuteman site: 00000000.

* * *
The early permissive action links were rudimentary. Placed in NATO weapons during the nineteen-sixties and known as Category A PALs, the switches relied on a split four-digit code, with ten thousand possible combinations. If the United States went to war, two people would be necessary to unlock a nuclear weapon, each of them provided with half the code. Category A PALs were useful mainly to delay unauthorized use, to buy time after a weapon had been taken or to thwart an individual psychotic hoping to cause a large explosion. A skilled technician could open a stolen weapon and unlock it within a few hours. Today’s Category D PALs, installed in the Air Force’s hydrogen bombs, are more sophisticated. They require a six-digit code, with a million possible combinations, and have a limited-try feature that disables a weapon when the wrong code is repeatedly entered.

The Air Force’s land-based Minuteman III missiles and the Navy’s submarine-based Trident II missiles now require an eight-digit code—which is no longer 00000000—in order to be launched. The Minuteman crews receive the code via underground cables or an aboveground radio antenna. Sending the launch code to submarines deep underwater presents a greater challenge. Trident submarines contain two safes. One holds the keys necessary to launch a missile; the other holds the combination to the safe with the keys; and the combination to the safe holding the combination must be transmitted to the sub by very-low-frequency or extremely-low-frequency radio. In a pinch, if Washington, D.C., has been destroyed and the launch code doesn’t arrive, the sub’s crew can open the safes with a blowtorch.

The security measures now used to control America’s nuclear weapons are a vast improvement over those of 1964. But, like all human endeavors, they are inherently flawed. The Department of Defense’s Personnel Reliability Program is supposed to keep people with serious emotional or psychological issues away from nuclear weapons—and yet two of the nation’s top nuclear commanders were recently removed from their posts. Neither appears to be the sort of calm, stable person you want with a finger on the button. In fact, their misbehavior seems straight out of “Strangelove.”

Vice Admiral Tim Giardina, the second-highest-ranking officer at the U.S. Strategic Command—the organization responsible for all of America’s nuclear forces—-was investigated last summer for allegedly using counterfeit gambling chips at the Horseshoe Casino in Council Bluffs, Iowa. According to the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation, “a significant monetary amount” of counterfeit chips was involved. Giardina was relieved of his command on October 3, 2013. A few days later, Major General Michael Carey, the Air Force commander in charge of America’s intercontinental ballistic missiles, was fired for conduct “unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.” According to a report by the Inspector General of the Air Force, Carey had consumed too much alcohol during an official trip to Russia, behaved rudely toward Russian officers, spent time with “suspect” young foreign women in Moscow, loudly discussed sensitive information in a public hotel lounge there, and drunkenly pleaded to get onstage and sing with a Beatles cover band at La Cantina, a Mexican restaurant near Red Square. Despite his requests, the band wouldn’t let Carey onstage to sing or to play the guitar.

While drinking beer in the executive lounge at Moscow’s Marriott Aurora during that visit, General Carey made an admission with serious public-policy implications. He off-handedly told a delegation of U.S. national-security officials that his missile-launch officers have the “worst morale in the Air Force.” Recent events suggest that may be true. In the spring of 2013, nineteen launch officers at Minot Air Force base in North Dakota were decertified for violating safety rules and poor discipline. In August, 2013, the entire missile wing at Malmstrom Air Force base in Montana failed its safety inspection. Last week, the Air Force revealed that thirty-four launch officers at Malmstrom had been decertified for cheating on proficiency exams—and that at least three launch officers are being investigated for illegal drug use. The findings of a report by the RAND Corporation, leaked to the A.P., were equally disturbing. The study found that the rates of spousal abuse and court martials among Air Force personnel with nuclear responsibilities are much higher than those among people with other jobs in the Air Force. “We don’t care if things go properly,” a launch officer told RAND. “We just don’t want to get in trouble.”

The most unlikely and absurd plot element in “Strangelove” is the existence of a Soviet “Doomsday Machine.” The device would trigger itself, automatically, if the Soviet Union were attacked with nuclear weapons. It was meant to be the ultimate deterrent, a threat to destroy the world in order to prevent an American nuclear strike. But the failure of the Soviets to tell the United States about the contraption defeats its purpose and, at the end of the film, inadvertently causes a nuclear Armageddon. “The whole point of the Doomsday Machine is lost,” Dr. Strangelove, the President’s science adviser, explains to the Soviet Ambassador, “if you keep it a secret!”

A decade after the release of “Strangelove,” the Soviet Union began work on the Perimeter system—-a network of sensors and computers that could allow junior military officials to launch missiles without oversight from the Soviet leadership. Perhaps nobody at the Kremlin had seen the film. Completed in 1985, the system was known as the Dead Hand. Once it was activated, Perimeter would order the launch of long-range missiles at the United States if it detected nuclear detonations on Soviet soil and Soviet leaders couldn’t be reached. Like the Doomsday Machine in “Strangelove,” Perimeter was kept secret from the United States; its existence was not revealed until years after the Cold War ended.

In retrospect, Kubrick’s black comedy provided a far more accurate description of the dangers inherent in nuclear command-and-control systems than the ones that the American people got from the White House, the Pentagon, and the mainstream media.

“This is absolute madness, Ambassador,” President Merkin Muffley says in the film, after being told about the Soviets’ automated retaliatory system. “Why should you build such a thing?” Fifty years later, that question remains unanswered, and “Strangelove” seems all the more brilliant, bleak, and terrifyingly on the mark.



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AND THIS IS REALLY COOL:
Top secret documents released by the Pentagon:
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/primary-sources-permissive-action-links-and-the-threat-of-nuclear-war.html

   这不能算战争电影，就像库布里克其他12部电影，从洛莉塔，2001太空漫游到大开眼戒，它们的哲学意味远大于作为商业片甚至类型片的意义。这部电影拍摄时正逢冷战胶着状态，大国关系处在非常微妙的平衡之中，谁都认为对方即将成为第三次世界大战的发动者，"核"成了最敏感的词汇，却又谁也割舍不下，Strange Love也就有了复杂的涵义。电影的结局是世界毁灭，这大概是历史上第一部拿现实国际政治开玩笑且以悲剧或者说是黑色幽默方式结局的电影，（在我所知的范围内）老库从来不会(Never ever)像斯皮尔博格那样给大家一个温情脉脉皆大欢喜的结局（如老库构思，斯皮尔博格拍的AI里，库设计的结局是永恒的寂静，斯却弄来了几个外星人在未来玩起死回生大赚眼泪…），这也就注定了他的每部电影都能引发无数的争论，最终部部都能载入史册。

让我来把这部电影讲一遍：
从前，有个男人阳痿了，他不肯承认是自己出了问题，然后觉得这个世界上的水有问题。再觉得所有世界上的女人都有毛病，如果不是你们的性需求，就不会有男人的阳痿。因为精子也是水，所以两个问题联系了起来~他觉得水是因为苏联人故意使坏，于是他去毁灭所有的水、毁灭苏联、毁灭世界。
从前，还有一个残疾男人，从来没有女人喜欢他，于是他一直做梦可以有取之不尽用之不竭的女人，每天除了sex什么也不做。然后世界毁灭了，他很高兴，这样就可以名正言顺躲在煤矿里为了人类的繁殖每天只fuck了~然后他的残疾竟然因此神奇地治愈了~

昨晚又温习了一遍此片（我的硬盘长期保留此片），再次证明了我的猜想。
片子的主体基本是主题政治荒诞剧，有反战因素，但又不可否认它的主题多元性，否则有很多场景、情节就难以解释。

主题多元性点滴，想到哪里写到哪里．

1、雄性暗示
　　片头介绍了末日装置的传言，就是轰炸飞机空中加油的特写，音乐是柔情的缠绵绵的，这里是个性行为暗示，看了片子画面你就懂了。
机长姓KONG，英语不好的不要怪我，这个姓在英语世界里只有大猩猩用过，还是雄性的象征。
　　机长骑着2000万吨级核弹兴奋的落向苏联的导弹工厂，胯下的2000万吨级核弹也是一个勃起象征。
　　还有很多，比如狂人瑞披的关于性的“精华”谈论，巴克将军对奇爱的1：10男女婚姻比例的向往和遐想……
　　雄性=暴力毁坏力+性欲求
　　这类暗示很多，自己去看吧

2、国家的军事化和最终纳粹化
　　奇爱原是德国人（他的原型里可能有德裔物理学家奥托·汉因和弗里茨·施特拉斯曼的因素），如果你不知道这两个家伙是谁，自己就别自以为自己能很懂这个片子，想理解影片内涵的人要需要大致和导演相似的知识背景，这是必须的嘛。
    现在他已经从纳粹科学家，经肮脏的“洗白”归化程序，而成为美国核战争的技术总负责人，鉴于核武器的特殊用途，他同时也是总统的冷战战略顾问，出席最高军事会议。而且，最后核战危机不可收拾的时刻，全体官僚、将军都要问计于他！这里的暗示已经很清楚。
    注意片子对博士身体上设置的几个暗喻。
    1. 他的那个假肢右臂，力量强大但又难以自制，时时忍不住行纳粹军礼，时时想扼死自己。（这是一个暗喻，手臂指什么？）
    2. 在提出核战末日应对预案时，博士的兴奋胜于恐惧，甚至兴奋得忘乎所以，语无伦次，声音高吭而颤抖，竟几次错误地把总统称为“我的元首！”（这是一个暗喻，元首指什么？）
    3. 这个依靠轮椅行动的瘫子，竟然神迹般的站了起来，（这里很可能反用了圣经），见马太福音第9章经文：9：2 有人用褥子抬着一个瘫子，到耶稣跟前来。耶稣见他们的信心，就对瘫子说，小子，放心吧。你的罪赦了。 此经常规的解释见 http://www.hislambs.net/axr/luguang/jdj1-26.htm
注意，片子最后一句对白也是博士以兴奋、扭曲甚至有些许恐怖声音说：“我的元首，我，我站起来了！”这是一个暗喻，瘫子和站立指什么？）

　　奇爱博士这个人物的设定，实际是说：冷战下的美国不仅要依靠纳粹军事科技，还必须依靠纳粹政治思维才能生存下去。如同片中，奇爱博士不只提供核威慑的技术性咨询，最后还为总统及全体官僚提出了一个核战后“矿井社会”荒谬的整体社会规划！换句话说，纳粹主义已经在冷战阴影下慢慢复活了——瘫子最终神迹般的站了起来就是一种象征。（个人观点，未经导演本人确认呵呵）

３、口是心非的冷战式“和平”
片子里有个诙谐戏剧因素，口口声声标榜倾向和平的人们实际上都是大战争贩子，这些情节另片子长生了很不错的幽默效果。比如，
　　满嘴外交辞令、装的一本三正经的的苏联大使阁下，实际上是个兼职窃照特务，而且窃照职业病还控制不住，偷拍成癖；
　　战略值班轰炸机基地是保证美国毁灭红色世界（当然地球也会全毁）的最后保证，基地的宣传栏却大书：我们的职业是和平；
　　属于人民的苏共总理，命令设计了被动式引爆的末日装置，敌人的任何核攻击会启动这个地球的毁灭，且污染物持续１００年。值得玩味的，美国人听到这消息几乎没有人恐惧，而是把它归为讹诈伎俩。
　　总统的电话，为了解释误会，大说“扫瑞”那段，几乎成了中国相声。
　　巴克将军是口是心非冷战式“和平”的集中表演者，他给总统汇报瑞皮发了疯擅自发动Ｒ计划时，大家可以看到他实际上是兴奋得不能自制，但在总统面前还要板着脸悔过这次指挥“失误”。说了没一会儿，就转到了怂恿总统将计就计、全面进攻苏联的新话题了。当全部飞机召回，可怜的巴克选入了深深的失望，但苏共总理抗议有一架漏网时，他几乎高兴得手舞足蹈：太妙了，又可以毁灭苏联——全部公产主义——以及整个地球了！！！

　（P.S.鸟笼山的傻大木台词，也有异曲同工之妙：“等我把地球毁灭了，我给你们发奖金！” 真可媲美了。）　
　　

4.敌意+封闭+疯狂=冷战式隔阂

影片的故事发生地主要有三处:
一是美国国防部作战室;高不见顶的巨大黑暗空间，只有聚光灯下巨大的会议圆桌前一张张政要的面孔，以及那幅大板苏联地图;
二是KONG机长的B-52轰炸机座舱、控制室和炸弹舱，一派性质盎然的节日气氛;
三是空军基地的外景和办公室内景。
片子一开始。三者之间据不再有沟通关系，各行其是，因为打冷战、怕窃听、反间谍、被敌人干扰一系列专业味道十足的理由，封闭了几乎所有的沟通渠道。
即使在每一个场景内，人与人之间也难以沟通。驰援机场的小队被守军无情的伏击，是为了防止俄军冒充偷袭；面对英国副手，瑞皮语言时而大谈其“体液哲学”，时而不着边际，时而疯人疯语；作战室里的热线电话打嘴架，军事官僚们对总统的战争诱惑、话题转移，与苏联大使的斗嘴和扭打。

库布里克运用“隔阂”来叙事，在讲不清道理的困境中，将道理讲清了，呵呵，形成了独特的叙事风格。


5。角色七人谈

彼得在片子里一人演三角

第一个是美国空军基地司令副官曼德里克，典型文职英国空军，娘娘腔，有些雌化，总把绅士文雅字眼挂嘴上，这一副手也恰恰符合了冷战形势中“英国是美国的跟班"的说法。曼德里克再美国老大面前很胆小，软弱，温顺，显得有些，但是骨子里还是有点小倔强、责任感的，这个小人物似乎比那些大人物们要更人性一些。

第二个是戴眼镜、大秃顶的美国总统，思维有些乱，说话有点飘，片中给他个人的头部特写镜头几乎没有，总都是把他“淹没”在一群政客幕僚的簇拥之中，大厅的黑暗更显得他渺小、不重要。也许是表现，他不过是一个职业政客身份特征，刻画出了他毫无主见。

第三个是奇爱博士，核心人物，一个笑容略带智慧、轻蔑与滑稽的核战策划家。虽然是坐着轮椅残疾人（暗喻遭到重创的纳粹主义），但是他和伟大的纳粹元首一样，长于演说鼓动、感情丰富、易激动、动作幅度特别大、时不时地习惯性抽动僵硬的躯体，满天吐沫星子的大谈其末日设想，给人的印象绝对的深刻。这个人物在影片中的显得非常突兀抢眼，他究竟代表着什么呢，也许他并不代表着某个人，应该是代表冷战、核战的精神源头。

这三个人，你看得出来都是一个演员演得么？向老库致敬吧各位

第四个是空军基地司令瑞皮，意识形态中毒深重的战争狂人，注意，导演多次用仰角镜头拍摄他的脸部特色，那根大雪茄不正代表着他的雄型勃起么。

第五个，轰炸机指挥官“刚”少校，又是个意识形态中毒深重的战争狂人，他切断一切与外界的联系，开始兴奋，发表激进的演说来激励下属，最后骑着核弹头兴奋呼叫着，掉下去实现了他的核战英雄梦

第六个，巴克将军似乎对和平不关心，还是个意识形态中毒深重的战争狂人，当然对女人除外，他对性感的女秘书竟然说着儿语调情。但是一旦得知事态的严重，他慌神得比谁都厉害，在作战室内的滑稽举动，他不是不安，而是内心兴奋与激动，和“刚”少校不相上下。


第七个，巴克的女秘书兼情人，这是片中唯一的女人，所以不得不提，出现的场景极其有限，基本就是个花瓶。政治与女人无关，但是与性有关。看看不多的几个镜头的色情味，难道还不够性暗示么？

2010.5.31再次修改